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Who or what gets to be counted as human? This paper is a response to the questions raised 
by the idea of inhumanism, in particular, two papers in the e-flux Journal, editions #52 and 
#53, by the philosopher Reza Negaretsani, respectively, The Labor of the Inhuman, Part I 
(Negarestani, 2014) and Part II: The Inhuman (Negarestani, 2014a).  
In Part I, Negarestani addresses the paradox of orienting ourselves between the cultural 
tropes of humanism and anti-humanism, of operating via ‘consensus or dissensus’ 
(Negarestani, 2014). In Part 2, Negarestani elaborates the commitment to a discursive 
inhumanism, one which requires rational agency to allow for the emergence of the human, 
albeit a speculative rationality which has the potential, (for Negarestani at least) to undergo 
a form of assimilation to an artificial, general intelligence, in which we ‘only become rational 
agents once we acknowledge or develop a certain intervening attitude toward norms that 
renders them binding’ (Negarestani, 2014a).  
Negrestani describes an augmented rationality which inhabits ‘the “area of maximum 
risk”—not risk to humanity per se, but to commitments which have not yet been updated, 
because they conform to a portrait of human that has not been revised’ (Negarestani, 
2014a). The obvious question we are left with is whether the division between the human 
and the non-human is sustainable, and in asking this question, do we naturalise an ontology 
which always foregrounds humanism, even if it is filtered through an anti-humanist lens? 
For Reza Negaretsani, inhumanism is a constructivist strategy to counter the infinite regress 
of the humanism-anti-humanism binary, in 2014, he wrote: ‘Inhumanism is exactly the 
activation of the revisionary program of reason against the self-portrait of humanity’ 
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(Negaretsani, 2014a). But it is imperative to remember that who gets to count as human has 
always been ideological, likewise the form of logic invoked by rational discourse is also 
always political, implicated with a colonial continuum. 
185 years since the abolition of slavery in the UK, the stability (or otherwise) of our 
ontological status as homo-sapiens, is still contingent, and arguably an issue of ever more 
palpable cultural and political urgency, with rising nationalisms and far-right politics, the 
question of who gets to count as human, agential and ‘rational’ has not gone away. 
 
Aside from the resurgence of racist populisms which deny the humanity and equality of all 
people, the ontology of humanism is also threatened, it would seem, by emerging forms of 
materiality, by the putative breakdown of separations between computers and humans, 
between, for example, communication networks and the spaces we inhabit, by the 
proposed accordance of ‘human’ rights to artificially intelligent entities, or, by the 
longstanding fact that corporations in America, ‘enjoy many of the same rights as American 
citizens. Both, for instance, are entitled to the freedom of speech and the freedom of 
religion.’ (Winkler, 2018). Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868, which was intended 
to protect the rights of former slaves, was often invoked to protect the rights of big 
business: 
Between 1868, when the amendment was ratified, and 1912, the Supreme Court 
would rule on 28 cases involving the rights of African Americans and an 
astonishing 312 cases on the rights of corporations. (Winkler, 2018). 
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In 2017, Saudi Arabia granted a robot citizenship, to ‘promote Saudi Arabia as a place to 
develop artificial intelligence – and, presumably, allow it to become a full citizen. But many 
pointed out that those same rights aren't afforded to many humans in the country.’ (Griffin, 
2017). Yampolskiy (2018) reminds us there is loophole in US law by which potentially 
‘anyone can confer legal personhood on a computer system, by putting it in control of a 
limited liability corporation in the U.S. If that maneuver is upheld in courts, artificial 
intelligence systems would be able to own property, sue, hire lawyers and enjoy freedom of 
speech and other protections under the law.’ (Yampolskiy, 2018).  
Despite the accordance of human rights to robots and potentially polluting corporations, the 
catastrophic warming of the Earth threatens the future of all life and objects supported by 
it, meaning that we are in it together, regardless of our ontological or social status. One 
might argue, in light of constructs such as the Anthropocene, that our ontology is 
inextricably entangled with our environment. But writers such as Todd and Davies remind us 
that the Anthropocene is a deceptive term, occluding an inextricable link between the 
warming of the planet and centuries of colonial domination, in which the: 
extension and enactment of colonial logic systematically erases difference, by 
way of genocide and forced integration and through projects of climate change 
that imply the radical transformation of the biosphere. Universalist ideas and 
ideals are embedded in the colonial project as it was enacted through a brutal 
system of imposing “the right” way of living. In actively shaping the territories 
where colonizers invaded, they refused to see what was in front of them; instead 
forcing a landscape, climate, flora, and fauna into an idealized version of the 
world modelled on sameness and replication of the homeland. (Davies and Todd, 
2017) 
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 For Negarestani a constantly dialogic relationship to the human and the inhuman is how 
‘reason’ emerges, it is a ‘landscape of navigation rather than an a priori access to explicit 
norms. The capacity to engage discursive practices is what functionally distinguishes 
sapience from sentience‘ (Negaretsani, 2014). However, Neagrestani’s rational discourse 
appears to have a lineage which goes back to Aristotle, to the Eurocentric framing of what 
counts as knowledge, a vector which flows from Aristotle to Boolean Logic. Dixon (2017) 
reminds us of the lineage of modern computing, in which: 
 
Boole’s goal was to do for Aristotelean logic what Descartes had done for Euclidean 
geometry: free it from the limits of human intuition by giving it a precise algebraic notation. 
To give a simple example, when Aristotle wrote: 
All men are mortal. 
Boole replaced the words “men” and “mortal” with variables, and the logical words “all” and 
“are” with arithmetical operators: 
x = x * y 
Which could be interpreted as “Everything in the set x is also in the set y.”  (Dixon, 2017). 
 
To be clear, Aristotle’s reduction of human knowledge to axiomatic statements is the logic 
from which modern symbolic logic and computation stems from. Aristotle derived the rest 
of his logical system (Dixon, 2017) from the following axioms: 
 
 An object is what it is (Law of Identity) 
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 No statement can be both true and false (Law of Non-contradiction) 
 Every statement is either true or false (Law of the Excluded Middle)  
 
For many non-European epistemic traditions, the reduction of reason to language and 
abstraction is irreconcilable with ‘the relatedness of land and flesh’ (Davies and Todd, 2017), 
irreconcilable with the concept of Place-Thought: 
 
 the non-distinctive space where place and thought were never separated 
because they never could or can be separated. Place-Thought is based upon the 
premise that land is alive and thinking and that humans and non-humans derive 
agency through the extensions of these thoughts (Watts, 21, 2013).  
 
For Todd and Davies ‘Industrialized capitalism might make us forget our entwined relations 
and dependency on this body of the Earth, but we are surrounded by rich traditions and 
many people that have not forgotten this vital lesson’ (Todd and Davies, 2017). The theme 
of humanness, whether it be Non-European, Post-human, Trans-human or Inhuman, 
appears to be the question of our time, it is, of course, always contentious, a filter for our 
most pressing concerns, a crucible for a continuum which encompasses right-wing 
technological determinisms and techno-feminist futures with myriad genders and races, but 
it is always, in Negarestani’s terms, a discursive space, in which sapience might emerge. The 
capacity for sentience and sapience is deeply implicated with the materiality and 
sustainability of our ecosystems, but it is also implicated with cognition and computation 
and with the materiality, or otherwise, of the digital, in an era in which we are confronted 
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by deep-fakes, increasing efforts to automate insights into human activity, to mechanise 
language and action, to reduce everything to number via the pervasive metrics of Big Data. 
In this context, is there any more value to be gained by defining ourselves as distinct from 
the rest of everything – to separate ourselves from the Upper Ontology of the World (Norvig 
and Russell, 2003)?   
 
The sinister metrics of Cambridge Analytica and Facebook have arguably made objects of us 
all (even those who do not access the internet). To paraphrase the artist Katherine Behar, 
the psychometric mechanisms of AI make our personalities into objects, into data points 
and ideological constructs which are separable from our bodies, from our situatedness 
(Behar, 2018). 
 In the huge, canonical text, ‘Artificial Intelligence, a Modern Approach’ (Norvig and Russell, 
2003) there is a diagram which purports to represent everything we can know. It is 
satisfyingly plain, lacking in ambivalence or noisy indecision. The title of the diagram is ‘The 
Upper Ontology of the World’, at the top of the diagram is, Anything, which branches into 
Generalized Events and Abstract Objects, both these branches hold further sub-categories, 
such as Places and Numbers, Things and Stuff. The ontology offers a God’s eye view, one 
which Haraway might term a ‘God-trick’ a view from above’ (Haraway, 1988) the view from 
nowhere. Though Norvig and Russell’s book has served as the mainstay for many Computer-
Science courses concerned with AI, the authors are wisely cautious about the limitations of 
such an ontology, they do not go as far as to identity the colonial nature of ontological 
hierarchies, or, indeed the epistemicidal injustices which such knowledge systems have 
served. But it is important to also note that Humans are not at the apex of Norvig and 
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Russell’s diagram, they are at the bottom, beneath Animals, Agents and Things, but they are 
categorically not the same as numbers, sets, sentences or measures. For Norvig and Russell, 
unlike Cambridge Analytica, Humans cannot be representational objects. 
Despite the enormity and thoroughness of Norvig and Russell’s text, it does not currently 
address the issue of colonialism, but at the time of writing (February 2019), there is an ever 
growing movement towards recognising the impact of colonialism, in particular 
acknowledging how data itself colonises and ontologises, towards addressing the cognitive 
injustice (Visvanathan, 1997) which arises from the dominance of Western regimes of 
knowledge and Western appropriation of, for example, mathematics and philosophy; There 
is also a growing movement to address the damage wrought by a Western relegation of the 
body – that which is uncontrollable, messy and inconvenient, wild, female, black male or 
brown - into something which is unrelated to reason and enlightenment.  As Nina Power 
(2017) writes: 
Historically, and not only historically, however, vast swathes of humanity have, 
for reasons of prejudice, acquisition, and other violent motives, been excluded 
from this image of the bearer of reason. 
 
Authors such as Boaventura de Sousa (2018), Noble (2018), Eubanks (2018) and O’Neil 
(2017) and movements such as Data4Blacklives, critique the idealisation of Western 
rationality (or, more accurately, that of the Global North) in particular, the idea of a 
rationality which is transcendental, God-like in its neutrality. The decolonial movement 
necessitates a critique of humanism, and is, one might argue, more prescient than 
Negarestani’s Inhumanism.  Ali (2016) writes how: 
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the modernity which colonialism engendered persists, albeit transformed under 
the condition of postmodernity, which has meant the persistence of certain 
‘sedimented’ colonial ways of knowing and being – that is, colonial epistemology 
and ontology – based on systems of categorisation, classification and 
taxonomisation and the ways that these are manifested in practices, artefacts 
and technologies (Ali, 2016). 
Humanism emanates from a Western notion of rationality which excluded not only the body 
as a site of knowledge, but women, black, and working-class people, as well as those who 
were criminalized for their sexuality. The project of decolonialization necessitates an 
‘intellectual inquiry concerned with engaging this legacy from a ‘critical’ perspective, 
contesting colonial domination from the vantage point of formerly colonised peoples’ (Ali, 
2016).  
 
The term Inhumanism originates from the poet and environmentalist, John Robinson Jeffers, 
(1887-1962) whose work resonates with environmental concerns, with the need to flatten 
the ontological hierarchy which always places the human at its apex, indeed, in the poem 
Carmel Point, Jeffers writes: 
We must uncenter our minds from ourselves;  
We must unhumanize our views a little, and become confident 
As the rock and ocean that we were made from. 
(1995) 
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Is such creative articulation. still a solely human trait, can we even speak of such exclusive 
traits without resorting to the solipsism John Robinson Jeffers warns us of? For Negarestani, 
‘inhumanism registers itself as a demand for construction, to define what it means to be 
human by treating human as a constructible hypothesis, a space of navigation and 
intervention’ (Negarestani, 2014).  
 
The value of inhumanism is that it provides scope for a discourse which prevents us from 
becoming ensnared in the idea there is no alternative, it  has the capacity to stop us falling 
into a state of despair, in which the ‘rubric of liberal freedom causes a terminal deficit of 
real alternatives, establishing for thought and action the axiom that there is indeed no 
alternative’ (2014).  
The lack of an alternative to Capitalism is the theme of Mark Fisher’s Capitalist Realism 
(2010). Fisher wrote of a ‘reflexive impotence’ (Fisher, 2010, 21) in the face of Capitalism’s 
apparent inevitability. But where does such resignation take us in these parlous times, what 
can we hold onto as a counter to the rapacious business ontology which dominates every 
facet of our lives? For Negarestani ‘Sociopolitical philosophies seeking to safeguard the 
dignity of humanity against the onslaught of politico-economic leviathans end up joining 
them from the other side’ (2014). 
In Negarestani’s terms, ‘antihumanism is revealed to be in the same theological boat that it 
is so determined to set on fire’ (2014), the reactive orientation of antihumanism, creates ‘a 
fog of liberty that suffocates any universalist ambition and hinders the methodological 
collaboration required to define and achieve a common task for breaking out of the current 
planetary morass.’ (2014) And yet, the objection to humanism is hardly theological for those 
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who are concerned with cognitive injustice, with the vital decolonising project which de 
Sousa Santos’s book title embodies: The End of the Cognitive Empire (2018).  
Now, more than ever, on the brink of apparent global disaster, it is imperative to challenge 
the dominance of Eurocentric thought over myriad other knowledges; the moment is 
overdue for oppressed social groups, for those who were never counted as human by 
humanism or enlightenment epistemology, to represent the world as their own, in their 
own terms. Rationality could be framed as a humanist construct, if we define it as Boolean 
logic, even acknowledging the scope of mathematics as a global practice, we must ask 
ourselves if, by evoking a constructivist methodology, a kind of Aristotelian dialogue with 
our ontology, Negretsani is constricting us to a specifically humanist reason, one which has 
historically excluded the colonised and other-wise marginalised, those not deemed rational 
enough to be granted a vote: historically the black, female, working-class and queer; if so, 
we must revert to the question which opened this paper, albeit in a slightly different form – 
who or what gets to count as inhuman? 
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